The End of Rent Control in Cambridge
編輯頁
https://www.nber.org/digest/oct12/end-rent-control-cambridge
In 1995, two months after voters in a state-wide referendum approved the elimination of rent-control policies in communities across Massachusetts, controls on apartment rental prices were almost entirely abolished in the city of Cambridge. In Housing Market Spillovers: Evidence From the End of Rent Control in Cambridge, Massachusetts (NBER Working Paper No. 18125), authors David Autor, Christopher Palmer, and Parag Pathak estimate that abolishing rent control added about $1.8 billion to the value of Cambridge's housing stock between 1994 and 2004, nearly a quarter of Cambridge's total residential price appreciation in this period. Nearly $1 billion of this increase came from the positive spillover impact of decontrol on the valuation of residential properties that were not previously covered by rent control.
In 1970, the city of Cambridge imposed far-reaching rent controls on residential properties built prior to 1969, placing strict caps on rent-price increases and implementing policies that made it difficult for property owners to remove rent-controlled units from the rental stock. Significantly, residential units built after 1968 and owner-occupied homes were exempt from the new rent-control rules. In all, more than one-third of the city's total residential units were subject to rent control.
In 1994, opponents of rent-control policies in Massachusetts placed a referendum question on the November general-election ballot that asked voters whether to eliminate rent-control ordinances and laws in cities and towns across the state, including in Cambridge. The state referendum to ban rent controls narrowly passed, by a 51-to-49 percent margin.
Just prior to the elimination of rent control in 1995, controlled units typically rented at 25 to 40 percent below the prices of nearby uncontrolled units, a clear benefit to tenants in those units. But valuations of rent-controlled units were significantly lower than non-controlled units, and evidence indicates that ownership investments in rent-controlled units, including maintenance, upkeep and capital improvements, were lower than investments in non-controlled units.
Immediately following rent decontrol, rents at formerly controlled units in Cambridge increased steeply. Simultaneously, residential turnover rose sharply, with the sharpest increase occurring at decontrolled units as tenants relocated in the face of rising rents. Over the next several years, direct dollar investments in housing units, as measured by building-permit filings, more than doubled on an annual basis.
To estimate the effect of decontrol on real estate values, the authors exploit a wealth of before-and-after property sales and assessment data from city real estate records, valuation and sales figures, building-permit filings, and U.S. Census data. Because the density of rent-control units varied from neighborhood to neighborhood, the authors are able to track inter-neighborhood and cross-neighborhood changes in housing prices, both within Cambridge and in nearby cities and towns that never had rent controls.
As theory would predict, the assessed values of previously controlled properties, which generally had lower valuations before the statewide referendum of 1994, increased substantially, by approximately 18 to 25 percent. More surprisingly, the authors also find a "large and significant" spillover impact from the removal of rent controls onto the valuation of never-controlled properties. Exploiting cross-neighborhood variation in the proximity of never-controlled units to previously controlled units, the authors estimate that decontrol raised the market value of never-controlled units by 12 percent on average between 1994 and 2004.
Although the value of previously controlled units rose by proportionally more than the value of never-controlled units, the never-controlled units were both more numerous and more desirable than the decontrolled units. Consequently, more than half of the induced rise in residential real estate values -- about $1 billion -- was due to positive spillovers to market value of never-controlled housing units. --Jay Fitzgerald NBER Today Working Paper Figure w30228 Nursing Home Quality Varies between and The Value of Intangible Capital figure The Value of Intangible Capital Related PAPERS Housing Market Spillovers: Evidence from the End of Rent Control in Cambridge Massachusetts
Chrome 譯文
劍橋租金管制的終結
1995 年，在全州公民投票中選民批准取消馬薩諸塞州社區的租金控制政策兩個月後，劍橋市幾乎完全取消了對公寓租金價格的控制。在住房市場溢出效應：來自馬薩諸塞州劍橋的租金控制結束的證據（NBER 工作論文第18125 號），作者David Autor、Christopher Palmer和Parag Pathak據估計，在 1994 年至 2004 年間，取消租金管制使劍橋的住房存量價值增加了約 18 億美元，佔這一時期劍橋住宅價格總升值的近四分之一。其中近 10 億美元的增長來自解除控制對以前不受租金控制的住宅物業估值的積極溢出影響。
1970 年，劍橋市對 1969 年之前建造的住宅物業實施了影響深遠的租金管制，對租金價格漲幅設置了嚴格的上限，並實施了一些政策，使業主難以將租金管制單元從出租庫存中移除。值得注意的是，1968 年之後建造的住宅單元和自住房屋不受新的租金管制規則的約束。總的來說，該市超過三分之一的住宅單元受到租金管制。
1994 年，馬薩諸塞州租金管制政策的反對者在 11 月的大選投票中提出了一個全民投票問題，詢問選民是否取消全州城鎮（包括劍橋）的租金管制條例和法律。禁止租金管制的州公投以 51% 對 49% 的微弱優勢獲得通過。
就在 1995 年取消租金管制之前，管制單位的租金通常比附近不受管制單位的價格低 25% 到 40%，這對這些單位的租戶來說是一個明顯的好處。但租金控制單元的估值明顯低於非控制單元，有證據表明，租金控制單元的所有權投資，包括維護、保養和資本改進，低於非控制單元的投資。
租金解除管制後，劍橋原先受控單位的租金立即急劇上漲。與此同時，住宅成交量大幅上升，其中租金上漲導致租戶搬遷，解除管制單位的成交量增幅最大。在接下來的幾年裡，根據建築許可文件的衡量，對住房單元的直接美元投資每年翻一番以上。
為了估計放鬆管制對房地產價值的影響，作者從城市房地產記錄、估值和銷售數據、建築許可申請和美國人口普查數據中利用了大量前後的房地產銷售和評估數據。由於租金控制單元的密度因社區而異，因此作者能夠跟踪劍橋和附近從未實行租金管制的城鎮的社區間和跨社區的房價變化。
正如理論所預測的那樣，在 1994 年全州公投之前通常估值較低的先前控制的財產的評估價值大幅增加了大約 18% 到 25%。更令人驚訝的是，作者還發現取消租金控制對從未控製過的房產的估值產生了“巨大而顯著”的溢出影響。作者利用從未控制的單元與以前控制的單元之間的跨社區差異，估計在 1994 年至 2004 年間，解除控制使從未控制的單元的市場價值平均提高了 12%。
儘管以前受控單位的價值按比例增長超過從未受控單位的價值，但從未受控單位的數量比解除控制的單位更多，也更受歡迎。因此，超過一半的住宅房地產價值上漲（約 10 億美元）是由於對從未受控制的住房單元的市場價值產生積極溢出效應。 ——傑·菲茨杰拉德